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[WIildlife once fed us and shaped our culture. It still yields
us pleasure for leisure hours, but we try to reap that plea-
sure by modern machinery and thus destroy part of its
value. Reaping it by modern mentality would yield not
only pleasure, but wisdom as well.1
I. Introduction
Advances in technology and changes in political philoso-
phies have brought about shifts in the relationships between
developed nations, developing nations and those considered
undeveloped. The balance of power, while still on the side of
the developed nations, has with increasing frequency, shifted
in the direction of the less developed nations.2 This has been
achieved through a number of steps, some deliberate and
some quite accidental. 3 Following World War II, the United
States and other powers recognized the need for economic
stability in order to ensure peace. Starting with Bretton
Woods 4 and continuing through its progeny, including the
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNY ALMANAC 187 (Oxford University Press
1987) (1949).
2. The United Nations is one such instance in which the power these
emerging States can wield, particularly when they form a coalition, can effec-
tively counter that of the most developed nations. See 1991 U.N.Y.B. 348, U.N.
Sales No. E.92.I.1.
3. Identification of new resources or new sources of exhaustible resources
often lead to a shift in a nation's position in the world market. The emergence
of the oil rich Middle East or the technologically advanced Pacific Rim States
are two of the most dramatic examples of this type of rise to prominence.
4. The Bretton Woods Conference (Bretton Woods) was held July 1-22,
1944 in Bretton Woods,. NH. The conference, more formally known as the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, resulted in the creation of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. By the summer of 1946 both creations had
begun operation.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/3
1999] THE CLASH BETWEEN THE WTO & THE ESA 323
planning for the International Trade Organization and even-
tually the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinaf-
ter GATT), the role of trade amongst nations has been
increasingly institutionalized. 5 The steps taken to provide
for free trade have limited the ability of the United States
and other developed nations to act unilaterally in order to
further its goals; be they economic, political or
environmental.
These same advances which have given rise to the global-
ization of the world's economy have also given rise to the
globalization of the potential threats to not only the global
economy but to the environment as well. 6 While not ex-
pressly included in the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.),
the U.N.'s position on the responsibility of nations to protect
the environment was clearly stated over twenty-five years
ago.7 "The protection and improvement of the human envi-
ronment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peo-
ples and economic development throughout the world; it is
the urgent desire of the people of the whole world and the
duty of all governments."8 It has become a generally accepted
obligation under international law that each government, in
the administration of its sovereign territory, must take into
account protection of the environment. 9 The environment to
be safeguarded includes: natural non-living resources, flora,
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The International Trade
Organization failed to come to fruition due to lack of support from key nations
including the United States. GATT came into force in 1948 as a contract be-
tween 123 governments. These signatory states account for over 90 percent of
the world merchandise trade. See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1994 WL
761804 (GATT) [hereinafter Final Act].
6. For example, the development and use of nuclear energy, offshore drill-
ing on the high seas, and the damming of rivers all pose potential threats not
only to the environment but to economies as well.
7. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
8. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972).
9. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 29
(July 8).
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and fauna. The level of protection afforded to these natural
resources varies according to the risk each faces.
Threats to the environment come from a number of
sources. Pollution of the atmosphere, deforestation, indus-
trial waste, harvesting techniques as well as military conflict.
All pose threats with potentially catastrophic results. Cer-
tain species of flora and fauna have been identified as being
in particularly vulnerable situations. 10 Amongst those spe-
cies which are threatened are all seven species of sea tur-
tles.'1 Sea turtles spend the vast majority of time at sea
where little is known about their existence. 12 Sea turtles
reproduce on land often migrating thousands of miles to
reach their nesting grounds. 13 Depending upon the species, it
may take upwards of fifty years for an individual sea turtle to
reach the age of reproduction.' 4 Sea turtles, or marine tur-
tles, vary greatly in size and migratory patterns. For exam-
ple, the leatherback turtle can grow up to eight feet in length
and weigh up to 910 kilograms. They have been tracked div-
ing to depths of over 3,600 feet and their migratory paths
cover many thousands of miles.' 5 All species of sea turtles
find themselves threatened in their natural habitats. The
term "threatened" may, in the case of a species of sea turtle,
mean that it is either "vulnerable" or "endangered."' 6
10. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Envtl. L. Rep. STAT 40336 (in force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter
CITES].
11. There are seven species of sea turtle: the flatback (Chelonia depressa),
the green (Chelonia mydas), the hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata), Kemp's
ridley (Lepidochelys kempii), the leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea), the log-
gerhead (Caretta caretta), and the olive ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea). See
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
May 15, 1998, 1998 WL 256632 at 4.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See generally World Wildlife Fund, Trade and Environmental Law
Clash in WTO Shrimp-Turtle Dispute (visited Sept. 15, 1997) <http:l!
www.panda.orgnews/press/news_149.htm>.
16. The danger to all seven species of sea turtles is internationally recog-
nized. The terms "vulnerable" and "endangered" may, in this context, be used
either colloquially or in their more technical sense. See supra note 10 (CITES
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/3
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Laws guaranteeing protection of the environment exist
both in domestic law and in international law. Unlike the de-
velopment of domestic environmental policy, the nature and
processes involved in the formation of international environ-
mental law give rise to an inherent vagueness of what is to be
protected, where it is to be protected, and by whom it is to be
protected.17 The schizophrenic personality which this dichot-
omy of domestic versus international policy presents is the
source for the topic of this Comment. The United States has
enacted statutes to protect the environment. Particularly rel-
evant to the topic at hand is the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)Y8 and Section 609 of the U.S. Public Law 101-162 (Sec-
tion 609). 19 Section 609 was passed in 1989 as an amendment
to the ESA in order to more specifically increase protection of
endangered sea turtles. 20 Certain restrictions provided for in
the ESA require that products caught in such a manner as to
pose a threat to an endangered or protected species may not
be purchased or sold in the United States. Congress placed
no geographical limitations on the application of the ESA.21
The ESA's scope extends beyond territorial seas and beyond
the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to all reaches of
the globe. By applying United States law outside of United
States' sovereign territory the United States is potentially
acting in violation of GATT. 22
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has before it a dis-
pute which embodies the struggle between international
includes all species of sea turtle, but the flatback, on their most endangered
lists).
17. See generally W. Michael Reisman & Siegfried Wiessner, International
Law in Contemporary Perspective (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
18. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
[hereinafter ESA].
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537, [hereinafter Section 609] amending Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b).
21. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 577 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995).
22. See id.
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trade and the protection of the environment.23 Thousands of
sea turtles are being drowned each year by shrimping fleets
from nations which do not require the use of Turtle Excluding
Devices (TEDs).24 In response to this, the United States has
placed an embargo on imports of shrimp caught by ships from
those nations which do not enforce the use of TEDs. The
claim of the non-TED nations is that this unilateral enforce-
ment of U.S. law amounts to a trade restriction and as such is
a violation of GATT. 25
This Comment will, in Part II, discuss the tension be-
tween the Endangered Species Act and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). With that as background,
the Comment will turn in Part III to the differing views of
international law and how it fits, if at all, with the domestic
law of the nation. Part IV will then review the Tuna dis-
putes to examine the dynamics between international and do-
mestic law and more particularly the ESA and GATT.26 The
issue currently before the WTO is the use of trawling meth-
ods which endanger sea turtles. Part V analyzes this tension
in light of the precedent set in the Tuna disputes as well as
specific legislation passed both domestically and internation-
ally. Part VI concludes that the strict interpretation of GATT
leaves very little opportunity for nations to act unilaterally in
order to protect the environment and offers little incentive for
others to join those nations interested in conservation.
23. The World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO] was created during
the Uruguay Round as a result of pressures, primarily from developed nations,
to facilitate resolution of trade issues. The WTO has, within its structure, the
ability to create panels to address trade disputes. See infra note 41.
24. National Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) estimates conclude that
shrimp trawling in Brazil, China, India and the Philippines account for the
death of more than 11,000 sea turtles each year. Indian biologists, in a recent
study, estimate that Indian trawlers killed 5,282 turtles in six months along
480 km of beaches. See David E. Kaczka, A Primer on the Shrimp-Sea Turtle
Controversy, 6 RECIEL: REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY AND INT'L ENVTL. L. 171, 173
(1997).
25. GATT prohibits signatory States from enacting either de jure or de
facto restrictions on trade. Once a nation claims to have been denied some priv-
ilege to which they feel they are entitled under GATT, they may then proceed
through the Dispute Settlement system.
26. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
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II. Laws in Conflict: The ESA and GATT/WTO
The struggle between ESA and international trade
agreements had been anticipated during the debate sur-
rounding the enactment of ESA in 1973.27 The Act was seen
as far reaching, extending beyond the United States' borders
into the territory of other sovereign states. By authorizing
the President to enact trade embargoes against nations found
to be in violation of the ESA, Congress clearly showed its in-
tent as to the breadth of this Act.28 The subsequent 1989
ESA amendments to expand protection for sea turtles were
held to be international in scope of application, regardless of
whether or not they may run into conflict with GATT.29 With
this as the backdrop it is important to look at both the ESA
and GATT to understand why this conflict has come to be.
A. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
After the international community, including the United
States, enacted CITES, Congress sought to enact a domestic
policy which would further facilitate the stated goals of the
international conference. 30 To that end, Congress enacted
the Endangered Species Act. The stated purposes of the ESA
are:
.. to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of
such endangered species and threatened species, and to
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the pur-
poses of the treaties and conventions...31
27. See id.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994). See also Marine Mammal Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994) [hereinafter MMPA] (further supporting the argu-
ment that Congress intended to enforce protection of the environment
extraterritorially).
29. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 577.
30. See CITES, supra note 10.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
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No interpretation of the ESA can deny that Congress in-
tended to apply the Act on an international scope. 32 This is
further supported by judicial findings.33
If the ESA had not been intended to be applied globally
but merely within the sovereign territory of the United
States, the conflict between the U.S.'s domestic environmen-
tal law and its international trade agreements would never-
theless still remain unresolved. So long as the ESA does not
allow the importation or the sale of products caught in such a
way as to further jeopardize an endangered or threatened
species, foreign nations could still make the same claim; that
by limiting sales the United States has in effect created a re-
striction to trade. There is little doubt that the United States
in the case of shrimp caught by vessels of non-TED nations,
has put restrictions on trade. These restrictions appear to be
in violation of GATT. The question the United States is now
confronted with is whether the trade restriction and corre-
sponding violation of GATT are justified or can be excused.
In 1989, in response to the detrimental effect of shrimp
trawl fishing on sea turtles, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce instituted certain regulations pursuant to the 1973
ESA.34 These initial regulations were met with strong disap-
proval from U.S. shrimpers who argued that it put them at
an unfair disadvantage in the market when compared to
shrimp imported from nations with less restrictive regula-
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (A)-(G) (1994). The treaties and conventions
referred to in § 1531(b) are listed in §(a)(4), which states:
[TIhe United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the
various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction pur-
suant to: (A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico; (B)
the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan; (C) the
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere; (D) the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; (E) the International Convention for
the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean; (F) the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora; and (G) other international agreements ....
See id.
33. See United States v. Bernal, 90 F.3d 465 (11th Cir. 1996).
34. See Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 50 C.F.R. § 227.72(e)(2)-(4) (1990).
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tions.35 The government as well as environmental groups
took the position that TEDs are extremely effective in pro-
tecting the endangered sea turtles and "represent the best
compromise between net productivity [for shrimp trawlers]
and conservation."36
Congress, following the lead of the Department of Com-
merce, added a provision to the ESA. This provision called for
the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with foreign
countries which engaged in fishing practices which may ad-
versely affect sea turtles.37 Included in these 1989 amend-
ments is a prohibition on importation of shrimp and/or
shrimp products from a foreign country whose harvesting ad-
versely affects endangered or threatened sea turtle popula-
tions.38 The amendment provides for a certification by which
the President can certify to Congress that the foreign country
has provided evidence that it has adopted a program to pro-
tect the sea turtles and that the incidental taking rate of its
ships is comparable to the U.S. ships. 39 Once a nation has
become certified the embargo is lifted. It has been noted by
some that the potential for market disruption is tremendous
as are the foreign policy implications. For this reason it is
assumed that the President has broad discretionary powers
in making his comparability standard determinations and
certifications to Congress. 40
35. See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of US Fish Import Em-
bargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24
GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 495 (1991).
36. Cooper, Gulf Shrimpers Attack TED's, 70 NAT'L FIsHERMAN 1 (Oct.
1989). Studies indicate that the nets are 97% effective in preventing sea turtles
from drowning when trapped by the nets of the shrimping vessels.
37. See McDorman, supra note 35.
38. See McDorman, supra note 35.
39. See McDorman, supra note 25.
40. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 976 (N.D. Cal.
1990). See also Chandler, Use of International Trade Restrictions as a Conser-
vation Measure for Marine Resources, (Dec. 1990) (unpublished paper, on file
with the George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics) (dis-
cussing unilateral trade restrictions imposed by the U.S.). See also, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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B. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
GATT entered into force in 1948 as a contract between
123 governments (signatory states). "The chief objective of
the GATT is to provide a secure and predictable international
trading environment, as well as a continuing process of mar-
ket opening."41 With the growth of free trade and concurrent
rise in awareness of environmental issues, it became appar-
ent that GATT was ill equipped to deal with the new realities
of free trade on a global level. Many nations recognized this
shortcoming and in 1986 trade ministers from the GATT sig-
natory states agreed to meet. This meeting has become
known as the Uruguay Round.42 Of primary concern to many
of the contracting parties was the need for a more effective
and expeditious dispute resolution mechanism by which con-
flicts between nations could be resolved. To this end, the
Agreements called for the creation of the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO). 43 The WTO serves as an umbrella organiza-
tion by embodying all of the Agreements reached by GATT.44
During the Uruguay Round proceedings it became apparent
that the conflict between trade and the environment would
need to be addressed as well.
1. The Uruguay Round: Goals of the WTO and
Improving on GATT
In establishing the WTO the contracting nations hoped
to create an efficient and effective mechanism within the or-
ganization which could handle dispute resolution. This mech-
41. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ACT, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, 1994 WL 761804.
42. The Uruguay Round derives its name from the place in which it was
agreed upon, Punta Del Este, Uruguay not where it was signed into effect. It
was finally signed into effect on April 15, 1994 in Marrakech.
43. The GATT Uruguay Round lead to a number of agreements. In addition
to the creation of the World Trade Organization, the Uruguay Round lead to:
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (S&P Agreement),
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures as well as the Dispute Settlement Procedures (DSP).
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41.
44. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41.
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anism affords countries with small and/or developing
economies the opportunity to obtain a fair hearing without
being subject to threats of linkage or unilateral reprisal. In
addition, larger and/or more developed nations would be able
to utilize the dispute resolution mechanism to try to ensure
compliance which other nations may have been able to avoid
in the past. By having a central mechanism by which to re-
solve disputes, less developed nations need no longer fear
unilateral action by the more developed nations and the de-
veloped nations no longer resort to such unpopular methods
in order to enforce compliance. 45
2. WTO's Dispute Settlement System
The actual mechanisms by which disputes are to be set-
tled by the WTO are laid out in the "Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes."46
The Dispute Settlement procedure is designed to promote
consultation and mediation and resolve all disputes within a
short period of time. 47 The initial stage of dispute settlement
is a period of consultations and mediation. 48 The consulta-
tion period, as designed, is to last up to sixty days. 49 The
countries involved in the dispute must consult with each
other to see if they can reach a mutually agreeable settle-
ment.50 During this phase the assistance of the WTO direc-
45. See Alan D. Minyard, The World Trade Organization: History, Struc-
ture, and Analysis, (visited Oct. 1, 1997) (hereinafter Minyard) <http:l!
www2.netdoor.com/-aminyard/>.
46. World Trade Organization, About the WTO, (visited Sept. 22, 1997)
(hereinafter WTO dispute 1) <http://www.wto.org/about/disputel.html>.
47. See id. The Dispute Settlement process of the WTO differs in some sig-
nificant ways from GATT in that the time frame has been shortened and con-
tracting members can not block the formation of a dispute settlement panel
(DSP). Rulings are now automatically adopted unless there is a consensus to a
reject a ruling thus no individual nation maintains veto power.
48. See id. See also Amelia Porges, Introductory Note for the Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33. I.L.M.
1125 (1994). See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Set-
tlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (Apr. 15, 1994).
49. See World Trade Organization, About the WTO, (visited Sept. 22, 1997)
WTO at <http://www.wto.orglabout/dispute2.html>.
50. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
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tor-general may be requested.51 The second stage is the
Dispute Settlement Panel (hereinafter Panel) stage.52
Within 45 days a Panel is to be created.53 This Panel is given
six months to attempt to resolve the dispute.54 Technically,
as created, the Panel is helping the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) make rulings and recommendations. 55 The Panel's
recommendation is then passed on to the DSB for final adop-
tion.56 This process, in theory, lasts three weeks.57 From be-
ginning to end, the dispute settlement process is scheduled to
take no more than one year.58 Appeals can add another three
months to the process. 59 The dispute settlement mechanism
adopted by the WTO is a great improvement over that em-
ployed by GATT.6o Individual nations can no longer single-
handedly block the formation of a Panel nor the adoption of
the Panel's recommendation. In addition, the time from ini-
tial complaint to resolution has been greatly reduced.61
3. GATT and the Environment
When GATT was initially drafted some fifty years ago
environmental policy was in its infancy.6 2 As a result GATT
does not specifically deal with the environment, but instead
treats it as it does all other policy measures. 63 At the com-
mencement of the Uruguay Round, the need for further de-
velopment of GATT's environmental policy was still not fully
appreciated. As the Uruguay round dragged on, however,
51. See Minyard, supra note 45.
52. See Minyard, supra note 45.
53. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
54. See Minyard, supra note 45.
55. See Minyard, supra note 45.
56. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
57. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
58. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
59. See WTO dispute 1, supra note 46.
60. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41.
61. The increased efficacy of the WTO's Dispute Settlement system is exem-
plified by the diversity of nations bringing complaint. In addition, almost 30%
of cases are settled before a panel is formed. See Renato Ruggiero, The WTO's
'most individual contribution', ABOUT THE WTO (visited Apr. 17, 1997) <http:l!
www.wto.org/about/disputel.html>.
62. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41, at 3.
63. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41, at 3.
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pressure from governments, including the United States,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and certain world
events brought the need for provisions to deal with the envi-
ronment to the front.64 The preamble to the Agreement Es-
tablishing the WTO includes a specific commitment to the
objective of sustainable development. 65 In addition, the Min-
isterial Decision on Trade and Environment establishes a full
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment.66 While the
Uruguay Round participants recognized a need to protect the
environment, no system was created to specifically handle en-
vironmental issues raised by trade disputes, or for that mat-
ter, trade disputes raised by environmental issues. The
adjudication of environmental disputes is forced through a
system designed to handle trade issues. 67 This is like trying
to fit a square peg into a round hole, an exercise in futility.
The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)
was established in January of 1995.68 The CTE is responsi-
ble for improving the relationship between the provisions of
the multilateral trading system and trade measures for envi-
ronmental purposes, including those pursuant to Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (MEAs).69 In fact, the CTE has
jurisdiction over cases or controversies involving the environ-
ment only as may be consequentially implicated by trade
agreements.7 0 In addition, resorting to the CTE as a source
of hope for environmentalists or governments wishing to in-
crease the level protection of the environment may prove to
64. Environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez incident, the explo-
sion of a chemicals plant in Bhopal, India, an accelerating rate of deforestation
of the world's rainforests, as well as acts of terrorism against the environment
(e.g. Iraq's policy of blowing up Kuwaiti oil fields) illustrated the extent to
which the environment needed additional protections.
65. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41, at 4.
66. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41, at app. B.
67. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and
the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 209, 250 (Mar. 1997).
68. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 41.
69. See Beyond the WTO: Finding Appropriate Homes.. .Issues of Trade and
Sustainable Development, INT'L INST. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV. (visited Sept. 25,
1997) <httpJ/iisdl.iisd.ca/wto/ctereport.html>.
70. See id.
13
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be futile. One of the proposed options for resolving those is-
sues which may exist between the WTO and MEAs is for
"[miembers to avoid using trade measures in MEAs which
are inconsistent with their WTO obligations."71 This is some-
what like trying to lower the murder rate by legalizing mur-
der. The result may look like an improvement on paper but
the end result will be the same. While this 'solution' will re-
sult in fewer complaints for the DSB, it will not help the
environment.
III. International Law v. Domestic Law: Us vs. Them,
We All Lose
Conflicts between the laws of the United States and
those of the constituent states have for the most part been
resolved. 72 The laws of the United States are supreme over
the laws of any individual state. 73 Certainly there exist con-
flicts between the laws of the several states and those of the
United States, but an accepted methodology for resolving
these disputes has been developed. The issue of the conflict of
laws is still alive and well in the forum of international law.
The United States has maintained that so long as it is not a
party to an international agreement it cannot be bound by
said agreement. Whether this is or is not the case is beyond
the scope of this Comment. 74 The issue arises in a real and
concrete way where the United States has become party to an
international agreement. Once the agreement or treaty has
been signed by the President and ratified by the Senate, that
law becomes the "law of the land."75 Or does it? Where does
this new "law of the land" fall in the hierarchy of laws? Is it
of the same weight as constitutional law or more like a fed-
eral statute enacted by Congress? Should it be treated as a
71. Id.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2.
73. See id. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
74. See generally Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17. For example, the
Law of the Sea Treaty was never signed by the United States. International
law has been interpreted to imply that a nation will be bound by an agreement,
regardless of whether it is a signatory, when that agreement has become the
generally accepted or de jure body of law in a given area.
75. See generally Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss2/3
1999] THE CLASH BETWEEN THE WTO & THE ESA 335
separate class of law? The two general theories of the rela-
tionship between international law and domestic law are du-
alism and monism. As these names imply, they offer differing
theories as to the dynamics of legal systems.
A. Dualism: Two Separate Systems, One Incomplete
Result
Briefly, dualism is the theory that the legal systems of
sovereign nations exist separately from the body of interna-
tional law.7 6 Dualists argue that the sovereignty of nations is
what gives force to international law and only by keeping
these legal systems separate can the world move on in a
peaceful manner. This may seem to be a bit of an oversimpli-
fication but for the purposes of this Comment this is as far as
this concept needs to be expanded. 77 Dualism can either be a
recognized practice of the legal institutions of a State (de
facto) or it may be a tacit approach (de jure).78
Either de facto or de jure, the implications for the envi-
ronment are similar. By maintaining the supremacy of the
domestic legal system and its laws, States fail to recognize
that international law, under the current regime of multilat-
eral agreements, is perhaps the only way to enforce environ-
mental protection laws beyond a nation's borders. For a
sovereign State to attempt to enforce its laws extraterritori-
ally and without resorting to possible violence, which is gen-
erally accepted as illegal in both dualist and monist views of
law, is next to impossible. 79 The United States has at-
tempted to enforce its environmental standards around the
rest of the globe.80 While the goals of the U.S. laws may be
76. See generally Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17, at 3.
77. See generally Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17, at 4.
78. Classroom Discussion with Prof. Gayle Westerman, Professor of Law,
Pace University School of Law, White Plains, NY, (Sept. 1997). See generally
Reisman & Weissner, supra note 17.
79. The decisions of the WTO are merely examples of one international
trade organization. Many more examples can be seen in the decisions of the
ICJ as well as UN resolutions.
80. The subject of this Comment, the Sea Turtle/Shrimp dispute, is a prime
example. In addition, the Venezuelan Gasoline dispute is another example in
which the United States' attempts to enforce its environmental standards on a
15
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desirable from the standpoint of protecting the environment,
they have been struck down by the WTO on a number of occa-
sions. This may not bother a true dualist who views U.S. law
(or any sovereign State's law) as superior to its international
counterpart and any decisions against it therefore to be of lit-
tle consequence. Unfortunately, this view fails to recognize
that the environment is not being protected whether the
United States likes it or not.
For example, the EPA has passed relatively stringent
regulations regarding certain substances which are found in
gasoline. Venezuelan gasoline contained more than the
amount set by the EPA.81 As a result the United States re-
fused to import this gasoline, maintaining that EPA regula-
tions took supremacy over GATT trade regulations which do
not allow an embargo of this type.8 2 As a result of this posi-
tion, the United States was found to be in violation of GATT
and was fined $100 million per year. The United States
maintained its position for three years before the EPA capitu-
lated and rewrote its standards in such a way as to admit the
Venezuelan product.8 3 The $300 million price tag the U.S.
was forced to pay ended up not in preventing dirty gasoline
from being imported nor in establishing the supremacy of
U.S. environmental law but instead resulted in the lowering
of the EPA's standards and a capitulation to an international
tribunal's findings which were clearly contrary to U.S.
interests.8 4
global level have been challenged. There are, however, many other examples in
which the standards set by the U.S. have been capitulated to whether it be
through financial means, diplomatic measures, etc.
81. See World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate
Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, 35 I.L.M. 603 (May 1996).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. It is interesting to note that many commentators believe that the EPA
decision to rewrite its regulations was delayed until after the 1996 Presidential
election to avoid embarrassing sovereignty issues.
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B. Monism: One Integrated Legal System, One Missing
Element
Monism seems to be the wave of the future. Monism
views the relationship between domestic law and interna-
tional law as one of fusion.8 5 International law need not be
superior to domestic law so long as it is not sublimated. The
recognition by sovereign States that international laws must
be adhered to will facilitate both free trade and protection of
the environment.8 6 Admittedly, this position may be viewed
as somewhat idealistic. To use the United States for the pur-
poses of analogy, suppose each sovereign State was similar to
one of the fifty states in its relationship to some international
body. As with each of the states, arguably to an even greater
degree, each nation may have differing views as to what it
feels should be law. Differing resources, histories, cultural
priorities, etc. all make international lawmaking a daunting
task. Perhaps the single most significant hurdle monism
faces in gaining acceptance and incorporation is its lack of
enforceability.
The most visible symbol of monism is the United Na-
tions. The hurdles faced by monism in gaining acceptance as
a viable system of laws are seen in the criticisms faced by the
United Nations. Since its inception the U.N. has been criti-
cized for its ineffectual nature. The Security Council is free
to issue resolutions but without enforcing these resolutions it
is a largely impotent body.8 7 This same lack of ability to en-
force its rulings has plagued (although some may argue,
blessed) the ICJ.88 Ideally, all nations would have the same
85. See Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17.
86. See Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17.
87. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23-32. (describing the make-up and role of the
Security Council). The author wishes to note that as this paper is being written,
the Secretary General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, is traveling to Iraq to attempt a
diplomatic resolution to the current crisis. This crisis is of the nature discussed
above, namely the Security Council's inability to effectively enforce the U.N.
resolution which came about at the end of the Gulf War which requires Iraq to
allow U.N. weapons inspections teams to monitor Iraq's cache of weapons.
88. See id. Some have argued that many of the ICJ's decisions were tem-
pered by the reality that there was no way to enforce them. To avoid embar-
rassment and loss of credibility the ICJ simply has tried to please everyone.
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priorities and would agree to some body as the source for in-
ternational law. This body would be endowed with the ability
to render judgment on disputes quickly and fairly and then
enforce these judgments with no fear of reprisal.
IV. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute and the GATT Exceptions:
A Fatal Analogy?
Under GATT certain exceptions exist which allow na-
tions to take measures limiting trade that normally would be
considered violations of GATT. There are essentially four
such exceptions. Examining the current dispute between the
United States (as defendant) and Malaysia (as complaining
nation) in the shadow of the Tuna/Dolphin dispute between
the U.S. and Mexico, it would seem that these exceptions may
not be enough to protect the United States' position or more
importantly protect the environment.8 9
A. The Article III Exception
The first of these GATT exceptions is Article III.90 Arti-
cle III allows for point of importation regulations. 91 These
regulations in the form of taxes, which would ordinarily not
be allowed by GATT, are considered internal regulations so
long as the products of one country imported into another
country are "accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like"92 domestic products. In an attempt to util-
ize this exception the United States' argument to the Panel
should be that the burden being placed on the foreign
shrimpers is no greater than that placed on the domestic fish-
erman as evidenced by 1989 Sea Turtle amendments provi-
sion for certification by the President.93 By allowing for
89. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
90. See GATT art. III.
91. See id.
92. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1617 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
93. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994) (further
supporting the argument that Congress intended to enforce protection of the
environment extraterritorially).
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certification, Congress has given foreign nations the ability to
avoid taxes on their products so long as that nation has taken
adequate measures to protect sea turtles. While this may
seem to be a compelling argument, recent history has proven
that this may not be a winning position.94
In 1991, Mexico requested the contracting parties to
GATT to form a dispute resolution panel (hereinafter Tuna
Panel) to review American trade regulations addressing
methods for catching tuna which may endanger dolphins. 95
By regulating the method by which tuna could be caught and
banning import of any tuna caught in such a manner as to be
in violation of these regulation(s), the United States sought to
enforce its Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) on for-
eign nations.96 Mexico argued that the United States' actions
had created trade restrictions and as such Mexico had been
denied access to U.S. markets to which it was entitled under
GATT. In 1972, the Tuna Panel concluded that because the
Act in question, the MMPA,97 did not regulate the tuna as a
product nor the sale of tuna as a product the Act was not al-
lowable under GATT's Article 111.98 The situation in the
Tuna/Dolphin dispute is analogous to that in the Shrimp/Sea
Turtle dispute. It is alleged that the U.S. is seeking to unilat-
erally regulate the way in which shrimp may be netted.99
Although the WTO does not employ stare decisis'0 0 or prece-
dent as such, the Panel is able to look at the conclusions of
previous Panels and use these decisions for guidance. 0 1
94. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
95. See id.
96. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994) (further
supporting the argument that Congress intended to enforce protection of the
environment extraterritorially).
97. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1421(h) (1994).
98. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
99. See WTO, Shrimp-Sea Turtle Dispute Resolution Panel (Feb. 25, 1997).
100. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). (Which defines stare
decisis as, "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.")
101. See Amelia Porges, Introductory Note for the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See
19
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B. The Article XI(2)(c)(i) Exception
Article XI(2)(c)(i) provides the second potential exception
to GATT which may allow for the U.S. actions. This Article is
intended to preserve exhaustible natural resources by al-
lowing nations to reduce the amount of imports. 10 2 The im-
porting nation must however reduce the amount its domestic
producers can sell in proportion to the restriction on imported
goods. In essence, under this exception the total number of
imports may be reduced so long as it does not amount to a
complete ban and domestic goods are also restricted. 10 3 In
addition, however, the restriction on the imported product
must be in proportion to restrictions on the domestic
equivalent product. This is a quantitative measure, not a
qualitative one. Thus the equivalency test is based on ton-
nage as opposed to methods of trawling.10 4 The nation mov-
ing to ban the import may only use this exception if there is a
similar domestic product which moves through the market in
similar quantities. 0 5 The United States tuna production cer-
tainly fulfills this prong of the exception. It fails, however, is
in its effect. Because domestic law requires U.S. vessels to
use approved nets there is in effect no restriction on U.S. tuna
by weight. So long as the vessels use approved netting meth-
ods there will be no restriction according to tonnage. Thus
the domestic equivalency element of the exception is not
satisfied.
C. The Article XX(b) Exception
The third exception to GATT which may allow for restric-
tions on trade is found in Article XX(b).106 Article XX(b) pro-
vides for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health." 0 7 In addition to being "necessary," as
also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Dis-
putes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (Apr. 15, 1994).
102. See GATT, supra note 5 at art. XI(2)(c)(i).
103. See McDorman, supra note 35 at 513.
104. See GATT, supra note 5 at art. XI(2)(c)(i).
105. See GATT, supra note 5 at art. XI(2)(c)(i).
106. See GATT, supra note 5 at art. XX(b).
107. GATT, supra note 5 at art. XX(b).
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described above, these restrictions will only be allowable so
long as they are not disguised restrictions on international
trade or are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiably dis-
criminatory manner.108 "The United States argued that the
MMPA's import provisions fell within Article XX(b)'s excep-
tion because (1) they served the sole purpose of protecting
dolphin lives, (2) they were 'necessary' within the meaning of
Article XX(b), and (3) no alternative measures were reason-
ably available to the United States to protect dolphin health
and lives outside of the United States' jurisdiction."10 9 Mex-
ico countered these arguments asserting: (1) Article XX(b)
was not applicable outside the territory of the contracting
party adopting the measures; and (2) the United States had
other means of achieving its goals besides its embargo of
tuna. 1 0 The Panel agreed with Mexico's arguments. In de-
termining the scope of Article XX(b), the Panel looked to the
source of the Article. Section 32(b) of the Draft Charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO) the Panel concluded
that the drafters intended Article XX(b) to apply domestically
only."' The Panel further found that if Article XX(b) was to
apply extraterritorially, each country would then be able to
legislate for all other areas of the world which could not have
been the drafter's intent. 1 2 Only those countries with ex-
actly the same domestic law would not be in conflict. As for
Mexico's second argument, the Panel found that the United
States had not exhausted other means by which to achieve its
goals. In the Panel's view, the MMPA did not fit into the ex-
ception provided for by Article XX(b)." 13
108. See GATT, supra note 5 at art. XX(b).
109. Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environ-
ment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 ENvTL. L. REP. 10268
(Apr. 1992).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (adopted Sept. 3, 1991).
113. See id.
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D. The Article XX(g) Exception
The final exception can be found in Article XX(g), which
provides for measures "relating to the conservation of ex-
haustible resources." 114 The arguments put forth by the
United States and Mexico fall along similar lines to those
urged in deliberating the Article XX(b) exception. The Panel
agreed with Mexico's claim that Article XX(g) cannot be ap-
plied extraterritorially. Again looking to the framer's inten-
tions, the Panel concluded that the framer's intended to
construe this exception strictly. It was concluded that the
ability of a sovereign to regulate an exhaustible resource ap-
plied only within the boundaries of its territory. The Panel
then determined that the only way a contracting nation can
effectively control an exhaustible natural resource is if that
resource is within that nation's territory. 115
It is important to bear in mind that all of the GATT ex-
ceptions are to be construed narrowly." 6 The conflict be-
tween Mexico and the United States as decided by the Panel
sent a very clear, and to U.S. fishermen and environmental
groups, disheartening message. The Panel had effectively
eliminated the United States' ability to act unilaterally to
protect the environment. Eliminating unilateral obstacles to
free trade is, after all, one of the primary purposes of GATT
and by extension the WTO.117 For those governments genu-
inely concerned with protection of the environment, eliminat-
ing unilateralism from their toolbox seriously hampers their
ability to act effectively to protect and conserve. As a result,
trade may flourish but the environment suffers.
V. The Shrimp/Sea Turtle Dispute: Different Actors,
Same Play?
With the Tuna dispute as background and the explana-
tion of the GATT exceptions, this Comment now turns to the
dispute at hand. As stated earlier, the WTO is a non-prece-
114. GATT, supra note 5 at art. XX(g).
115. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 109.
116. See generally GATT, supra note 5.
117. See GATT, supra note 5.
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dent or non stare decisis system; the DSB is not bound by
previous decisions but may use these prior decisions as a ba-
sis for its reasoning in future decisions. Whether the Panel
would choose to use the Tuna Panel's reasoning and apply it
to the Shrimp/Sea Turtle dispute was one of great speculation
amongst the interested parties. As expected by many the
Panel has found that the United States' Section 609 is incon-
sistent with GATT, in particular XI and that it does not fit
within any of the exceptions mentioned above. 118
A. Background
Shrimp trawlers tend to operate in shallow coastal wa-
ters which are often frequented by sea turtles. 119 The meth-
ods employed by the shrimpers often result in the death of a
number of sea creatures which are not the sought after prod-
uct.' 20 Shrimp boats use trawling nets which by design are
dragged behind the vessel.12' These nets entangle all that is
in their path. When a sea turtle is entangled in the net, it is
unable to surface to breathe. Depending on the trawling
times sea turtles are drowned as a consequence. 22 The use
of TEDs has been estimated to save ninety percent of those
turtles which are initially caught in the net. 23 The TEDs are
viewed, at least by the United States, as an inexpensive, sim-
ple method to protect the endangered and threatened sea
turtles.
118. See 1998 WL 256632 (W.T.O.), supra note 11 at 300.
119. See Kathleen Doyle Yaninek, Turtle Excluder Device Regulations: Laws
Sea Turtles Can Live With, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 256 (1995).
120. See id.
121. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation
and the Court of International Trade, 15 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 57, 59
(1996-97).
122. It is worthy of note that some have suggested shortening trawling times
as a way of saving sea turtles. While in theory this may be effective, it would be
extremely difficult to enforce. The majority of trawling vessels employed in
shrimping are large (over 25 feet) and drag two or more nets. These types of
vessels tend to have long trawl times, in excess of 90 minutes. Turtles caught
in these nets have little chance of survival. See Kaczka, supra note 24.
123. See Kibel supra note 121 at 61.
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B. Public Law Section 609 No. 101-162
All species of sea turtles are migratory. Much of their
migratory path takes them through the waters of the U.S., in
which they are largely protected, and into waters of other na-
tions which do not require the use of TEDs. In order to
counter the threat to the sea turtles while outside of U.S. ter-
ritorial seas, Public Law 101-162 § 609 was passed. 124 Sec-
tion 609 embodies two methods to promote the use of
TEDs.125
The first method provided for in Section 609 directs the
Executive branch, through the Departments of State and
Commerce, to identify those nations whose fishing practices
endanger sea turtles. Once identified, the U.S. is to negotiate
agreements with these nations. These agreements are to re-
quire the use of TEDs. In addition, the Department of State
is to work to amend existing conservation treaties to includes
TED requirements. As an incentive to shrimp harvesting na-
tions, under the aegis of Section 609, the Department of State
and the NMFS created a TED technology transfer program.
This program offered through the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development provides training on construction, instal-
lation and usage of TEDs. It is offered at no charge to
fishermen and government representatives. 26
The second prong of Section 609 is the source of the con-
troversy currently before the WTO. Section 609(b) provides
for a ban on imported shrimp harvested in a manner that
poses a threat to sea turtles. 27 The ban is based on the fish-
ing practices of each country as well as that government's
policies.' 12 These policies are to be reviewed by the State De-
partment. Nations whose policies are largely similar to ours,
124. See Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. No.
101-162, 103 Stat. 1037 (1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537) (1992).
125. Application of Section 609 was expanded globally by the U.S. Court of
International Trade. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559
(1995).
126. See Kaczka, supra note 24.
127. See Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. No.
101-162, 103 Stat. 1037 (1989) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537) (1992).
128. See id. See also Steve Charnowitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of
the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 10567 (1994).
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in terms of results, may be exempted from the ban and will be
completely unaffected by Section 609. The regulations im-
posed by foreign nations on their shrimping fleets need only
be largely comparable to those required by the ESA. 129 Fac-
tors such as incidental take rates as well as trawl types and
tow times are taken into account in the State Department's
evaluation. 130 U.S. fishermen must comply with the ESA as
amended in 1989.131 The ESA requires the use of TEDs
which release at least 97% of turtles encountered.132
Initially Section 609 was applied only in the wider Carib-
bean. This limited application was protested by environmen-
tal groups which sued to expand its application. 33 The
court's ruling that Section 609 was to be applied globally wid-
ened the scope of the effected nations. 3 4 Several nations
challenged Section 609 as being inconsistent with GATT. In-
dia, Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan all have joined in the
complaint and requested formation of a DSP. In light of ear-
lier decisions in the Tuna cases as well as the Venezuelan
Gasoline case, it seems unlikely that the Panel will find Sec-
tion 609 to be consistent with GATT. 135
C. International Law's Protection of the Sea Turtle
The unilateral effort of the United States is not the sole
attempt at protecting sea turtles. A number of international
agreements have entered into force which in effect should
protect the sea turtles. 1 36 The application and enforcement of
these agreements is often difficult at best and impossible at
129. See Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 50 C.F.R. § 227.72(e)(2)-(4) (1990).
130. Tow time is the interval between trawl doors entering the water and the
trawl doors being removed from the water. See 1998 WL 256632, at 301
(W.T.O.).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 559.
134. See id.
135. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
at 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna I]. See also GATT Dispute Settlement Panel,
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839
(1994) [hereinafter Tuna II].
136. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
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worst. The efficacy of these agreements have come into ques-
tion. No international treaties specifically call for the use of
TEDs despite the efforts of the Department of State required
by Section 609. Instead, many international agreements util-
ize broad provisions which may (or may not) be interpreted to
obligate states to protect sea turtles through domestic
regulations.
The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Spe-
cies of Wild Animals [hereinafter the Bonn Convention] obli-
gates signatory States to prohibit the taking of endangered
migratory animals. The Bonn Convention defines taking in
broad terms which include prohibition on "hunting, fishing,
capturing, harassing, deliberate killing, or attempting to en-
gage in such activity."137 This definition includes both inten-
tional and incidental taking. The Convention on Biological
Diversity [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention] requires par-
ties to enact legislation protecting threatened and endan-
gered species. In addition, the nations must regulate
processes which have a significant adverse effect on biological
diversity.138
The United Nations has not been silent on the issue of
protecting the environment. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) speaks to conservation and
protection in a number of its articles. 13 9 Article 61, section 2
requires that the State "shall ensure through proper conser-
vation and management measures that the maintenance of
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not en-
dangered by over-exploitation." 140 Article 194(5) calls for
States to take measures "necessary to protect and preserve
rare and fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine
137. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
(Bonn), in force Nov. 1, 1983, 19 I.L.M. 15.
138. See Convention on Biological Diversity, (Rio de Janeiro), in force Dec.
29, 1993, 31 I.L.M. 822 (1993).
139. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Montego Bay),
Dec. 10, 1982, in force Nov. 1, 1994, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS.
140. Id.
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life." 141 Both Article 61 and Article 194(5) would appear to
effectively protect marine life. Their effectiveness is of course
only as good as the U.N.'s ability to enforce these articles.
Unfortunately this is quite limited. In addition, these regula-
tions only apply to signatory States. The United States has
failed to sign this Convention for a variety of reasons. While
the U.S. does not appear to pose a particularly large threat to
these species, its failure to sign brings into serious question
the Convention's global acceptance and enforceability. The
U.N. has also adopted the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 142 This
Code specifically identifies fishing gear and protection of non-
target species as guiding principles to be maintained in
marine conservation efforts. This Code, however, is purely
voluntary. While some of its regulations may eventually be-
come accepted as customary international law, until they are
enforcement is nearly impossible and threatened and endan-
gered species continue on their way toward extinction. 143
D. Conclusions of the Dispute Resolution Panel
In a letter from India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
acting jointly, consultations were requested with the United
States pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding of the
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) and Article XXII:1 of GATT.' 44 These consultations
were sought to discuss the ban imposed under Section 609 on
the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products.
These consultations failed to produce a resolution to the mat-
ter. Eventually the matter was referred to a Panel. On April
6, 1998, the Panel issued its final report to the parties. 145 Af-
141. Id.
142. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries adopted Oct. 31, 1995, (last modified Janu-
ary 1999) <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/faoinfo/fisherie/agreem/codecond/
codecon.htm>.
143. For a general discussion of the formation of international law, see gener-
ally Reisman & Wiessner, supra note 17.
144. See United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, May 15, 1998, 1998 WL 256632 at 3.
145. See id. at 4.
27
348 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
ter nearly 300 pages the Panel concluded that the United
States was in violation of GATT and recommended to the Dis-
pute Settlement Body to request that the U.S. bring itself
into compliance. 146
This finding and subsequent recommendation were not
surprising to any of those that have followed the pattern of
decisions which the WTO Panels have issued. Time and time
again the environment comes out on the short end. This is
logical as the system is set up to protect trade and not the
environment. It is interesting to note that the Panel did
make mention of the fact that it was not deciding on the ur-
gency of the protection of sea turtles. 147 Instead, as the Panel
stated
The matter we have been asked to review is Section
609 as interpreted by the CIT and as applied by the United
States on the date this Panel was established. It was not
our task to review generally the desirability or necessity of
the environmental objectives of the U.S. policy on sea tur-
tle conservation. 148
The Panel almost apologetically went on to state "[i]n our
view, and based on the information provided by the experts,
the protection of sea turtles throughout their life stages is im-
portant and TEDs are one of the recommended means of pro-
tection within an integrated conservation strategy."1 49 One
of the things that came out of this Panel was an increased
role for third parties, in particular NGO's. 150 The overall ef-
fect of this is yet to be seen. It is possible that large multi-
national corporations may be able to directly lobby and poten-
tially influence the WTO. On the other hand, smaller, less
well financed groups such as those which seek to protect the
environment may also have increased access to the Panels.
Note that the Panel need not give any credence whatsoever to
146. See id. at 300.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 301.
150. See James Cameron & Stephen J. Orava, WTO Opens Disputes to Pri-
vate Voices, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5.
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any of these amicus briefs unless adopted by the member na-
tion and submitted along with that nation's brief.151
VI. Conclusion
Almost every nation on Earth is a party to CITES or
some other agreement or convention which should address
the protection the sea turtles. Nevertheless, the precarious
situation of the sea turtles persists and continues to worsen.
In order to protect this endangered genus the United States
has enacted certain regulations which efficiently and inex-
pensively reduce the risk of death to sea turtles. The use of
TEDs prevents the unintentional killing of sea turtles
through incidental takes by 97%. The regulations mandating
the use of TEDs have been enacted for vessels operating in
U.S. territorial waters. 152 However, this enforcement scheme
has only been effective up to the limits of the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone, or approximately 200 miles extending sea-
ward from our coasts. Migratory sea turtles, once beyond the
limits of our protected waters, face the risk of drowning at the
hands of non-regulated shrimp trawlers.
In order to extend this protection beyond our waters, the
U.S. as part of Section 609 calls for a ban on the importation
of shrimp from nations which do not require the use of TEDs
or in some other way protect sea turtles from incidental
takes. Congress has given the President the ability to certify
nations which comply with the TED regulation or in some
other way achieve to a comparable level the reduction in the
rate of incidental takes seen in the U.S.' 53 Nations unwilling
to adopt these standards face a ban on the import of their
goods. 154
Four nations, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan,
have complained to the WTO that this ban amounts to a
GATT inconsistent regulation. 55 As such they have re-
quested the formation of a DSP to decide whether or not the
151. See id. at B6.
152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See GATT, supra note 5.
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U.S.'s unilateral action is consistent with GATT. In light of
previous decisions, it seems highly unlikely that the DSP will
find in favor of the United States. Many of the issues in the
Tuna disputes again appear before this Panel. 156 If the Panel
finds for the complaining nations the U.S. will be faced with a
decision which epitomizes the conflict between trade and en-
vironmental protection. The U.S. will need to decide whether
it is willing to pay fines or have restricted access to foreign
markets for our exported goods in order to continue its poli-
cies aimed at protecting the sea turtles. The fines and re-
strictions, must according to WTO rules, be in proportion to
the ban imposed by the United States. Regardless of which
choice the U.S. makes, sea turtles will continue to be taken by
the thousands. 157
Unless GATT and the WTO are willing to take a stronger
stand on protecting the environment, it is quite likely that we
will continue to see nations such as the U.S. taking unilateral
action in defiance of GATT. While GATT stands in direct op-
position to unilateral trade restrictions and the WTO may re-
solve the dispute in favor of the complaining nations, the
United States will still have furthered the cause of saving en-
dangered and threatened species. When initially enacted,
Section 609 was applied only to the wider Caribbean, affect-
ing a mere fourteen nations. Twelve of these nations have
become certified under the Presidential powers created by
Section 609. The effect of the United States enacting a uni-
lateral trade restriction has resulted in improved protections
for sea turtles within this sphere originally encompassed by
Section 609. In addition, it appears that these nation(s) have
had little difficulty in applying Section 609 to their domestic
laws and shrimp trawling fleets.
156. See Tuna Panel Report, supra note 26.
157. To illustrate, if the dispute resolution panel takes the amount of time
anticipated by the WTO and includes the inevitable appeal, the process will
take from start to finish approximately 15 months. According to studies done
by the United States and India, a complaining nation in this dispute, over
150,000 sea turtles will die in incidental takes during the duration of this dis-
pute. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. at 559.
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The message being sent by the WTO thus far has essen-
tially said that in order for the United States to be on friendly
terms with GATT it must acquiesce to the less restrictive and
consequently more harmful regulations of other nations. Lost
somewhere between the New World Order and the U.S.'s obli-
gations to free trade and its attempt to protect the world's
environment are the sea turtles.
Just as World War II gave rise to our current interna-
tional system, focusing on the importance of free trade to
guarantee a safe and stable world, perhaps it is time that the
United States once again takes a leading role in reexamining
and refocusing the geopolitical system in order to facilitate
trade in a more enlightened manner. This trade must allow
for stability not only within economic and political systems
but also provide for stability and protection of the environ-
ment as well. GATT must be viewed as an experiment which
has been largely successful but in light of new developments
and advances, we are ready to move on to the next level of
guaranteeing global stability not only for our human systems
but for its ecosystems as well.
The words of the Panel along with the increased willing-
ness to give a role to non-governmental parties may play out
to the benefit of the environment in future disputes. The
Panel seemed to recognize that decisions based upon trade
consideration may not effectively protect or even deal with
the environment.
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what
we have not decided in this Appeal. We have not decided
that the protection and preservation of the environment is
of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly it
is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that
are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures
to protect species, such as sea turtles. Clearly they can
and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states
should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multi-
laterally, either within the WTO or in other national fora,
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to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the
environment. Clearly, they should and do. 158
It is possible that all of this offers a glimmer of hope that
change may be on the horizon and that this change may come
from within the WTO itself. Clearly it has been ineffective on
a global scale, from the perspective of environmentalists to
act unilaterally. Trade issues have always been inextricably
intertwined with environmental issues. It is only relatively
recently that this relationship has been recognized by those
involved. Perhaps the WTO is beginning to realize it can no
longer ignore what has become so apparent.
158. 1998 WL 720123, at 54 (W.T.O.) at para. 185.
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